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Abstract
Irrigated agriculture is one of the most important sources of nitrate pollution of water resources. For this reason, during
the past decade, various policies have been proposed in order to prevent this negative impact of farming activities. The aim
of this work is therefore to analyze the effects of the joint application of the last Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) reform
with different policy instruments designed to mitigate nitrate pollution. To this end, models based on Positive Mathemati-
cal Programming have been developed to enable simulating irrigators’ productive behaviour in the event of the implemen-
tation of these instruments. The results indicate that the latest CAP reform (partial decoupling of subsidies) will by itself
lead to an important reduction in nitrate pollution. If this reduction is not regarded as being sufficient, other specific pol-
icy instruments could further reduce this source of pollution. In this sense, the most suitable one could be the application
of nitrogen fertilization quotas.
Additional key words: agricultural policy, economic instruments, environmental policy, positive mathematical program-
ming.
Resumen
Análisis de instrumentos políticos para el control de la contaminación por nitratos de la agricultura de regadío en
Castilla y León (España)
La agricultura de regadío es una de las principales fuentes de contaminación por nitratos de los recursos hídricos. Por
este motivo en los últimos años han surgido diferentes políticas encaminadas a evitar esta externalidad negativa de la acti-
vidad agraria. En este sentido, el objetivo de este trabajo es analizar los efectos de la aplicación conjunta de la última refor-
ma de la Política Agraria Común (PAC) y diferentes instrumentos políticos mitigadores de la contaminación por nitratos.
Para ello se han empleado modelos de simulación basados en la programación matemática positiva, los cuales permiten
simular el comportamiento productivo de los regantes frente a la hipotética implementación de tales instrumentos. Los
resultados obtenidos ponen de manifiesto que esta externalidad negativa va a reducirse de forma significativa gracias a la
última reforma de la PAC (desacoplamiento parcial de las ayudas). Si esta reducción no se considerase suficiente, otros
instrumentos específicos permitirían una reducción adicional de esta fuente de contaminación. En este sentido el instru-
mento que puede resultar más adecuado es el establecimiento de límites máximos a la fertilización nitrogenada.
Palabras clave adicionales: instrumentos económicos, política agraria, política ambiental, programación matemática
positiva.
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Introduction
Average fertilizer consumption in the EU-15 is 174.1
kg ha year-1. This high application rate of fertilizers,
combined with its often inappropriate use, generates a
surplus of nitrogen in the soil of 83 kg N ha year-1
(OECD, 2008). This causes water pollution by nitrates,
one of the most serious environmental problems in
developed countries (OECD, 2005). In Spain the gener-
al situation is not so worrying, because fertilizer con-
sumption (121.5 kg ha year-1 average) and the nitrogen
balance (33 kg N ha year-1 average) are considerably
lower than those of the EU-15 (MIMAM, 2006; OECD,
2008). Nonetheless, these national average data hide the
problem linked to irrigated agriculture, an agricultural
subsector which makes intensive use of these fertilizers
and is the main source of diffuse contamination of water
resources in Spain (MIMAM, 2000). Indeed, a separate
analysis of this type of agriculture confirms that both
nitrogen consumption and nitrogen balance are very
high, even exceeding the European average (Gómez-
Limón et al., 2007; MIMAM, 2007). The environmen-
tal impact of such situation is evident, given that in
Spain most of the declared nitrate-vulnerable zones are
located in irrigated areas and their surroundings
(MIMAM, 2006).
Given this problematic scenario, the national author-
ities face the challenge of designing and implementing
the necessary instruments to minimize the impact of
agriculture as the main source of diffuse pollution of
water resources (Martínez and Albiac, 2004). During
the past two decades, therefore, various policies at EU
level have been implemented to deal with this situation,
as pointed out by the EEA (2005). It is worth highlight-
ing some of these policies, namely: a) the Nitrate Direc-
tive, which has the principal objective of reducing
nitrate pollution of water resources caused by agricul-
ture, b) the new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in
which, since its 1999 reform (Agenda 2000) subsidies
to farmers are conditional on the fulfilment of a set of
environmental requirements, and c) the Water Frame-
work Directive (WFD), which seeks to implement new
hydrological plans leading to a ‘good ecological status
of waterbodies’.
The theoretical study of nitrate pollution control
policies began in the eighties with the seminal works
of Griffin and Bromely (1982), Shortle and Dunn
(1986) and Segerson (1988). Since then, the scientif-
ic community has performed intensive studies of this
problem. Among recent works in this field, those of
Martínez and Albiac (2006), Segerson and Wu (2006),
Aftab et al. (2007), Semaan et al. (2007) and Suter et
al. (2008) are worth mentioning. In brief, this litera-
ture points out that policies designed to reduce nitrate
pollution of agricultural origin can be implemented in
various ways, in particular through the use of taxes
and/or subsidies, the setting of emission quotas and
the application of certain market instruments. For a
detailed discussion of this issue, see Shortle and Abler
(2001).
Within this general framework, the main objective
of this study is to analyse the economic, social and
environmental impacts of the implementation of dif-
ferent policy instruments aimed at reducing nitrate
pollution (nitrogen fertilization quotas, eco-tax for
nitrogen fertilizers, irrigation water pricing and the
limitation of the surface for intensive nitrogen activi-
ties) within the context of the new CAP, which was
established after the Mid-Term Review. The compara-
tive analysis was carried out by means of a case study
of the irrigated area (IA) of Arévalo-Madrigal in the
province of Ávila in central Spain, an agricultural sys-
tem potentially vulnerable to nitrate pollution. For this
purpose, a methodology based on the positive mathe-
matical programming has been developed, in order to
simulate farmers’ behaviour when facing the new
CAP scenario and the various policy instruments con-
sidered. The study aims to provide informative sup-
port for decision makers when designing and imple-
menting the programme of measures for inclusion in
the new hydrological plan for the Duero river basin,
which must be approved before 2010, as required by
the WFD.
The next section of this paper shows a description of
the agricultural system studied. The third section pro-
vides a detailed presentation of the methodology adopt-
ed for the empirical application and the origin of the
information used to feed the models built, while the
fourth describes the specific formulation of the simula-
tion models used for each of the policy instruments
being considered. The fifth section synthesizes the
results of these simulations, while the sixth outlines the
most relevant conclusions reached.
Case study
The IA of Arévalo-Madrigal covers 13,662 ha in the
southern part of the Duero river basin in the Province of
Ávila. This agricultural system is located in the Spanish
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North Plateau, at an average altitude of 900 m and with
a typical continental climate; long, cold and relatively
wet winters followed by short hot and dry summers. The
annual rainfall is low, averaging less than 450 mm. Irri-
gated agriculture is the only alternative to the typical
rain-fed cereals monoculture in this area, allowing sum-
mer crops to be grown.
The IA comprises 1,133 farms, for an average irrigat-
ed farm size of 12.1 ha. The predominant crops in the
zone are cereals (maize –Zea mays L.–, barley
–Hordeum vulgare L.– and wheat –Triticum aestivum
L.) covering 69.3% of the total surface area. Industrial
crops (sugar-beet –Beta vulgaris L.– and sunflower
–Helianthus annuus L.) are also important, occupying
22.4% of the IA. Other relevant crops are potatoes
(Solanum tuberosum L.) and alfalfa (Medicago sativa
L.), covering 2.4% and 1.2% of the IA, respectively. The
remaining cultures, such as legumes and vegetables, are
of minor importance. The water used by irrigated agri-
culture is supplied by an important groundwater body,
Hydrogeological Unit 02.17, also known as ‘Los Are-
nales’ aquifer. Because of the origin of the groundwater
source, pumping is required to obtain water. The exis-
tence of these pumping systems explains why the pre-
dominant system for irrigation in this zone is based on
sprinkler technology, which is used to irrigate all crops
in the area.
The increasingly intensive use of groundwater for
farming in this area is jeopardizing the sustainability of
this water resource, in both quantitative and qualitative
terms, as extraction has surpassed natural inflow,
resulting in over-exploitation of the aquifer. This situa-
tion has led to the suspension of new permits for water
extraction since 1998. The agricultural system utilises a
network of 14 stations for quality control managed by
the public authority in charge of water use (Confe -
deración Hidrográfica del Duero), which regularly
report data on groundwater nitrate concentration (see
www.chd.es). The data reveal that the average values of
nitrogen concentration in the groundwater below the
study area during 2003-2007 have ranged between 10
and 30 mg NO3- L-1, although during summer periods
these concentrations have reached maximum values
ranging between 55 and 65 mg NO3- L-1. It should also
be pointed out that this Hydrogeological Unit mentions
problems of arsenic pollution, also of agricultural ori-
gin. Both types of pollution have led to the suspension
of the water supply for human consumption in 26
municipalities located inside or near this IA (Fernández
et al., 1998).
Methodology
Policy scenarios and instruments analysed
CAP scenarios
Two CAP scenarios have been considered. The first
represents the previous policy situation, derived from
the application of Agenda 2000 (“CAP-2000” scenario),
which is considered as the baseline scenario in order to
compare the other results. The second scenario analysed
refers to the CAP reform introduced by the European
Council in 2003 and which came into force in Spain in
2006. This reform introduced the partial decoupling of
direct subsidies to herbaceous crops as its main novel
aspect. This scenario also contemplates the implementa-
tion of the new reform of the Common Market Organi-
zation (CMO) of sugar in 2009. This scenario is labelled
“CAP-reformed”. The characteristics of the two scenar-
ios are as follows:
– “CAP-2000” scenario. This scenario represents
the CAP framework in effect until 2005/2006,
whereby public support to the agricultural sector
was effectuated via direct payments per unit area
of €63.00 Mg-1 of theoretical county yields for
cereals and oilseeds. In the case of protein crops,
payments increased to a limit of €72.50 Mg-1.
– “CAP-reformed” scenario. This scenario is charac-
terized by the partial decoupling of the payments
received in the previous scenario. Therefore, the
producers of herbaceous crops receive a direct cou-
pled payment (linked to crop area) equal to 25% of
the support received previously (€15.75 Mg-1 for
cereals, oilseed and protein crops). The remaining
75% of the support became part of the Single Farm
Payment (SFP) that would be received annually by
farmers regardless of their crop mix (for further
details, see García Álvarez-Coque, 2006). More-
over, this new scenario includes the restructuring of
the sugar sector promoted by the new sugar CMO.
In this new scenario, the sugar sector is thus charac-
terized by: a) a decrease in the sugar-beet selling
price from €48.00 Mg-1 (CAP-2000 scenario) to
€40.00 Mg-1, b) the integration of sugar-beet into
the SFP, which now also includes annually €11.00
Mg-1 delivered during the biennium 2004-2005, and
c) the compulsory abandonment of 50% of produc-
tion, with farmers being compensated with €40.00
Mg-1 delivered as average during the period 2004-
2008.
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Policy instruments for nitrate pollution control
Taking into account the various policy instruments
that would theoretically be suitable for diffuse nitrate
pollution control (Martínez and Albiac, 2004, 2006;
Semaan et al., 2007) and the particular characteristics of
the IA analysed (private irrigation initiatives and
groundwater resources), for this study the following
four alternative policy instruments have been selected
as the most interesting ones for their potential imple-
mentation:
– Instrument 1 proposes restrictions on the con-
sumption of nitrogen fertilizers (nitrogen fertiliza-
tion quotas). For the implementation of this policy
instrument five different maximum levels of nitro-
gen fertilization are proposed: 120, 100, 80, 60
and 40 kg N ha-1. These figures were chosen con-
sidering that current average nitrogen fertilization
in the IA is 136.0 kg N ha-1. Thus, the first level
(120 kg N ha-1) would be fixed in order to assure
that most farmers will be under this average.
Lower quotas would force further decreases in
nitrogen use by farmers.
– Instrument 2 suggests the implementation of an
“ecological” tax on the use of nitrogen fertilizers,
targeted to reduce nitrogen demand for agricultur-
al production. Five different levels of application
of this eco-tax have been considered, ranging from
€0.20 to €1.00 per kilogram of nitrogen applied
in fertilization. These values were chosen consid-
ering current application of this instrument in the
different European countries where it is imple-
mented (Sweden, Austria and Finland; see Nam et
al., 2007).
– Instrument 3 considers the introduction of volu-
metric water pricing. Water and nitrogen are one
of the most important inputs in irrigated systems,
being both characterized by limited substitution
(their use can be adjusted by a von Liebig produc-
tion function, as explained in Paris and Knapp.
1989, Paris, 1992 and Knapp and Schwabe, 2008).
This is why water pricing (reducing water
demand) is at the same time an instrument to
reduced nitrogen use. Following this rationale, six
price levels were selected for the simulation of this
policy instruments, ranging between €0.01 and
€0.06 m-3, in a hypothetical attempt to implement
the cost recovery principle as set out by the WFD
in the Duero basin (Gómez-Limón and Riesgo,
2004; Riesgo and Gómez-Limón, 2006).
– Instrument 4 proposes limiting the cultivated area
of the most nitrogen-intensive crops, which are the
potentially most polluting ones. In this case study,
this restriction would affect sugar-beet, maize and
potato, which nitrogen requirements are above 200
kg N ha-1. Thus, five different simulation scenarios
are proposed, which limit the maximum area of




Modelling farming activity at agricultural system
level (or at any other level that deals with a set of indi-
vidual farms) implies problems of aggregation bias.
Indeed, modelling a set of farms in a unique program-
ming model overestimates the mobility of resources,
allowing the modelled farms to combine resources in
proportions that are not possible in the real world
(Hazell and Norton, 1986). This aggregation bias can
only be avoided if the farms included in the models ful-
fil strict homogeneity criteria (Day, 1963): technologi-
cal homogeneity, pecuniary proportionality and institu-
tional proportionality.
The IA under consideration as a case study is locat-
ed in a single agricultural county and uses a single
source of water. Hence, bearing in mind soil-quality
homogeneity, and technological, institutional and mar-
ket characteristics, it could be considered that the case
study area is an analytical unit that fulfils the above-
mentioned homogeneity criteria. Thus, it might seem
reasonable to assume similar behaviour for all farmers
in the study area, which would mean that the operation
of the policy instruments being considered could be
analysed through a single simulation model with rela-
tively small problems of aggregation bias. However,
this assumption must be rejected, since experience
demonstrates that the behaviour of individual farmers
can differ widely due to the heterogeneity of crop cost
and/or the disparity in their objectives. This explains
why farmers operating in the same agricultural system,
with similar resources availability, invest in a wide
range of crop plans (Gómez-Limón et al., 2004). For
this reason, in order to avoid the aggregation bias in
simulation, it is needed the classification of farmers
into homogeneous groups with regard to their crop
mixes. For this purpose, the most appropriate statistical
technique is cluster analysis, which utilises farmers’
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actual crop mixes as classification criteria (Berbel and
Rodríguez, 1998).
In order to develop a typology of producers, a survey
was carried out among producers, with the aim of gath-
ering information on crop mixes that would allow the
farmers’ production to be characterised. This informa-
tion enabled to apply cluster analysis, taking Euclidean
squared distance as a measure among actual crop mixes
(vector crop area expressed in percentages). The Ward
or minimum variance method was utilised as the aggre-
gation criterion.
The simulation technique: positive 
mathematical programming
Positive mathematical programming (PMP) is a mod-
elling technique developed by Howitt (1995) which
allows calibrating Linear Programming (LP) models
using the information contained in dual values. PMP
has been widely accepted by economists as a means of
analysing policy scenarios and instruments affecting
farming activities. A large number of Spanish studies
that use PMP include those of Calatrava and Garrido
(2001), Júdez et al. (2001), Arriaza and Gómez-Limón
(2003), Atance and Barreiro (2006), Oñate et al. (2007)
and Iglesias and Blanco (2008).
The PMP assumes that the productive activity
observed in a given farm or set of farms is a conse-
quence of the farmer’s profit maximization behaviour.
Thus, the differences observed among farmers are due
to the different production costs faced by each one of
them. On the basis of this assumption, this mathemati-
cal programming technique attempts to estimate the
costs of different crops, which permits the same crop
mix distribution as the one observed in the real world to
be obtained through a mathematical programming
model.
The PMP calibration described by Howitt (1995),
also known as the “standard PMP approach”, is based
on three steps. The first step consists of building a LP
model in order to obtain the dual values variables for
each of the activities (crops) considered. The following
step uses the dual values variables to calibrate the cost
function of the individual crops. Finally, the cost func-
tion parameters are used to define a new objective func-
tion for the PMP model. Thus, the LP model developed
in the first step is transformed into a non-linear pro-
gramming model that will reproduce the base year crop
distribution, and can be used to simulate future or hypo-
thetic scenarios which would lead into new productive
behaviour.
However, this primitive focus has been strongly criti-
cized, and some important shortcomings of this tech-
nique have been identified (Heckelei and Britz, 2005;
Henry de Frahan et al., 2007). This led to further devel-
opment of the PMP with the aim of mitigating the draw-
backs of the original method. In this respect, the works
of Paris and Howitt (1998), Heckelei and Britz (2000),
Júdez et al. (2001), Paris (2001), Paris and Howitt
(2001), Preckel et al. (2002), Britz et al. (2003), Heck-
elei and Wolff (2003) and Röhm and Dabbert (2003) are
of particular relevance.
Within the context of PMP development, Röhm and
Dabbert (2003) present an extension which permits a
higher degree of substitution between similar crops
(called ‘variant activities’), rather than between other
less close crops (activities). These variant activities are
taken into account in order to obtain more realistic
results. Thus, the concept of variant activities can be
applied to the same crop that is grown under different
techniques, as well as to crops from the same family
which are equally well adapted to local conditions and
are equally susceptible to the same pests (Röhm and
Dabbert, 2003).
The mathematical formulation of this extension of
the PMP can be summarized as follows. Bearing in
mind the different activities (i) and the possible variants








Eq. [1a] represents the LP model objective function,
where TGM is the total gross margin (assuming profit
maximization). The TGM is calculated as the sum of the
gross margins resulting from each activity. For this rea-
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i, with variant j). These xi,,j are considered to be the deci-
sion variables of the model. In order to calculate the
TGM it is also necessary to have the following technical
coefficient data: price (pi,,j ), yield (yi,,j), variable cost
(ci,,j) and CAP direct subsidies, coupled to the produc-
tion per unit area (si,,j) for each crop that can be regard-
ed as alternatives.
The above-mentioned model presents a set of con-
straints, which can be interpreted as follows. Eq. [1b]
limits the total agricultural land available, where x0i,j rep-
resents the crop mix observed in the base year. Eq. [1c]
represents the constraints for total activities, ε1 being a
small positive number. Finally, Eq. [1d] represents the
constraints for the variant activity, with ε2 another small
positive number that must satisfy Eq. [1f].
The addition of Eqs. [1c] and [1d] forces an optimal
solution in the LP model which reproduces the activi-
ties observed in the base year (x0i,j). As a result of the
introduction of the final two constraints, the model
solution generates the dual values for the different
activities. Eq. [1c] produces the dual values of activi-
ties λ i and Eq. [1d] indicates the dual values of the
variant activity λ i,j. Nonetheless, as in the primal the
number of constraints exceeds the number of vari-
ables, some of the variables have dual values equal to
zero. This circumstance is observed in the dual value
of the least profitable activity (λ i) and in the dual value
of the least profitable variant activity (λ i,j). Neverthe-
less, this situation can be solved by calibrating the
least profitable crops, at the same time changing the
dual values obtained previously (see Röhm and Dab-
bert, 2003).
Once the transformed dual values have been
obtained, Eq. [2] represents the general objective func-
tion for a PMP model, taking into account the variant
activities:
[2]
From this equation, after a series of transformations,
Eq. [3] emerges, being the extended version of the
PMP:
[3]
This extended version of PMP has been also criti-
cized, particularly because of the implicit subjectivity in
the definition of the groups of variant activities, consid-
ering that this grouping might influence the response of
the models (Blanco et al., 2008). However, the extend-
ed version of the PMP method has been widely adopted
by the scientific community, and is the technique cho-
sen for several recent studies: Key and Kaplan (2007),
Schmid et al. (2007), Wirsig et al. (2007) and Henseler
et al. (2008).
Economic, social and environmental attributes
Irrigated agriculture is closely linked to economic,
social and environmental issues (Gómez-Limón et al.,
2007). Bearing this in mind, as well as the main objec-
tive of this work, a set of indicators that enable the
effects of the individual proposed policy instruments to
be quantified has been chosen:
– Economic impact. This impact will be measured
by the total gross margin obtained by farming
activity (TGM). This indicator is the difference
between income (sales and subsidies, both cou-
pled and decoupled included in the SFP) and
total variable costs. The gross margin can be
regarded as a valid estimator of the private prof-
itability in the agricultural activity, which is
measured in € ha-1.
– Social impact. Agricultural labour (AL) demand
can be considered as a social indicator that enables
the contribution of the agricultural sector to rural
development and territory balance (population set-
tlement, income distribution, etc.) to be quanti-
fied. The measurement unit of this indicator is
work-days ha-1.
– Environmental impact. This impact is measured
via two indicators. The nitrogen balance (NBAL),
used as an indicator is calculated by the difference
between nitrogen inputs and outputs. The differ-
ence represents the amount of nitrogen leached
into the surrounding environment, which in turn
is an indicator of the environmental impact of irri-
gated agriculture on water quality. This indicator
is expressed in kg N ha-1. The second indicator is
the water use (WATER), quantified in terms of
volume of water per irrigated hectare. This indica-
tor allows the quantitative pressure to be meas-
ured in m3 ha-1, that exerted by agriculture on the
aquifer.
All the above-mentioned indicators have been calcu-
lated by using technical coefficients per unit area (ha)
for each crop i and variant j (for further details, see
++=









































30 J. Gallego-Ayala and J. A. Gómez-Limón / Span J Agric Res (2009) 7(1), 24-40
OECD, 2001; and Bazzani et al., 2004). The final value
obtained for each simulated policy scenario and eco-
nomic instrument has been derived from farmers’ opti-
mal crop plans (xi,j) based on the models built for each
case.
Data sources for feeding the models
The data needed to feed the simulation models were
gathered from primary and secondary sources. Second-
ary data were extracted from the Anuarios Agroalimen-
tarios de Castilla y León (CAG, various years). In par-
ticular, data regarding prices and yield productions were
collected from this official source. Primary data were
obtained from two surveys. The first focused on agricul-
tural technicians working in the IA (agricultural exten-
sionists, farmers’ organization advisors, university
teachers and researchers), and was aimed at collecting
information about production techniques and input
prices. A total of seven experts were consulted. The sec-
ond survey focused on irrigators working in the IA, and
this collected information about crop mix, structural
variables of farms and socio-demographic characteris-




As a result of the cluster analysis (see Section
“Decision-making heterogeneity and cluster analy-
sis”), three different homogeneous groups were
defined, as can be observed in Table 1. The main fea-
tures of the different farm types identified are summa-
rized as follows:
• Cluster 1. This first group includes 31% of the
farmers interviewed, representing 68% of the area
of the IA. This group is characterized by middle-
aged farmers (around 50 yr old) who manage large
irrigated farms (an average of 115 ha per holding).
The main crops of this farm type are winter cere-
als (wheat and barley), covering about 70% of the
irrigated area. This group has been labelled as
“large cereal growers”.
• Cluster 2. The second group of farmers comprises
about half of the farmers sampled, representing
around 30% of the total irrigated area. This group
consists of older farmers, with an average age of
54 yr, who manage medium-sized irrigated farms
(an average of 31 ha). The characteristic crop mix
mainly includes of winter cereals and sugar-beet,
representing 65% and 21% respectively of the irri-
gated area. This group has been labelled as “cere-
als and sugar-beet growers”.
• Cluster 3. This third homogeneous group com-
prised 19% of the farmers, and they worked only
2% of the IA. This group profile is characterized
by irrigators with an average age of 50 years, who
manage small farms (average of 6 ha). The main
crop in this farm-type is sugar-beet, covering 93%
of the total irrigated area. This group has been
labelled as “small sugar-beet growers”.
The proposed modelling approach was then individ-
ually implemented for each cluster. In order to obtain
results at the IA level, the individual results were aggre-
gated by weighting the sum of the land represented by
each farm type, in order to minimize aggregation bias
regarding the whole IA results (see Section “Decision-
making heterogeneity and cluster analysis”).
Modelling baseline scenario (CAP-2000)
In order to build the simulation models for each
farm type it was necessary to take into account the area
given over to each crop in the area, as decision vari-
ables (xi,j). Before enumerating the decision variables
selected, and taking into account the PMP extension
followed, the group of irrigated winter cereals was
defined in terms of two different variant activities1:
irrigated wheat and irrigated barley. The activities cho-
sen for modelling were thus defined as follows: irri-
gated winter cereals (x1), with the two variants of irri-
gated wheat (x1,1), and irrigated barley (x1,2), rain-fed
wheat (x2), rain-fed barley (x3), maize (x4), irrigated
sunflower (x5), rain-fed sunflower (x6), sugar-beet (x7),
potato (x8), irrigated alfalfa (x9), rain-fed alfalfa (x10)
and set-aside (x11). It is worth noting the usefulness of
the inclusion of rain-fed crops as alternatives, with the
purpose of increasing the flexibility of the model,
allowing farmers the option of ceasing irrigation and
1 For the case study presented in this work, the rain-fed crops have not been adopted as variant activities, because the crop mix obser-
ved in the base year did not present these activities.
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introducing these crops as in rain-fed areas, as happens
in the real world.
The objective function for the CAP-2000 scenario is
adjusted to the principle of profit maximization, as pre-
sented in Eq. [3]. This objective function, however, was











This is the model from which the calibration param-
eters λ i and λ i,j were estimated, allowing for the simula-
tion of the CAP-reformed scenario and the different pol-
icy instruments for nitrate pollution control (see Section
“The simulation technique: positive mathematical pro-
gramming”).
Modelling CAP-reformed scenario model
From the calibration made through the extended PMP
version utilised, it is possible to build a model in which
the CAP-reformed scenario is shaped. Eq. [5a] describes
the objective function in which the new SFP scheme is
included, as a consequence of the reformed CAP, calcu-
lated on the basis of subsidies historically received by the
producers, and the compensation for the compulsory
abandonment of sugar-beet (SUBAB). This additional
payment of €40.00 per non-produced tonne of sugar-
beet is received only once. Therefore, this amount is
annualized at an interest rate of 5%, i.e. €0.80 Mg year-
1. Thus, SUBAB equals 0.80 x 50% x sugar-beet quota.
[5a]
Subject to:
Base model constraints: 
[5b]
Sugar-beet abandonment constraint: 
[5c]
In addition, as reflected in constraint [5c], it must be
noted that the model for this new CAP scenario includes
the compulsory abandonment of 50% of sugar-beet pro-
duction by all farmers.
2 The set of contraints [4a], [4b], [4d] y [4e], will be represented hereaflter as AX ≤ B.
Percentage Percentage Average size
Code Label over total over total per holding Main crops
farmers in surface of (ha)
IA IA
G1 Large cereal growers 31.2% 68.4% 115 Winter cereals, maize, 
and sugar-beet
G2 Cereals and sugar-beet growers 50.0% 29.5% 31 Winter cereals and 
sugar-beet
G3 Small sugar-beet growers 18.8% 2.1% 6 Sugar-beet
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Modelling selected instruments for pollution
control
Model for instrument 1: nitrogen fertilization quotas
This model simulates the implementation of a com-
pulsory limit for the application of nitrogen fertilizers.
The objective function for this scenario thus corre-
sponds to Eq. [5a]. However, in order to simulate this






Maximum nitrogen application constraint: 
[6c]
where NAij refers to the nitrogen application for each
crop, and NALFk is the nitrogen application limit for
each of the suggested levels (k = 120, 100, 80, 60 and 40
kg N ha-1).
Model for instrument 2: eco-tax for nitrogen fertilizers
For the implementation of an “ecological” tax on the
use of nitrogen fertilizers, the suggested simulation







where tN is the eco-tax for the nitrogen fertilizer applica-
tion, whose values range from 0.20 up to €1.00 kgN-1.
Model for instrument 3: irrigation water pricing
In order to simulate farmers’ behaviour when facing
irrigation water pricing, Eq. [8a] defines the objective





Sugar-beet abandonment constraint: 
[8c]
where tw is the value of volumetric water pricing and
WRi,,j are the water requirements for crops i,j. In this
case, tw ranges between 0.01 and €0.06 m-3.
Model for instrument 4: limitation of the surface 
for intensive nitrogen activities
This model simulates the application of a limitation
on the cultivated area of the most nitrogen-intensive
activities. The objective function for this scenario thus
also corresponds to Eq. [5a]. Nevertheless, in order to
simulate this instrument the model is subject to:
Base model constraints:
[9a]
Sugar-beet abandonment constraint: 
[9b]
Surface limit constraint: 
[9c]
where MSLk refers to the maximum area allocated to
nitrogen-intensive crops, expressed in percentage terms
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Results
The resolution of the models described above
enabled, first, to obtain results for each of the three ana-
lyzed farm types. Subsequently, through the weighted
aggregation of partial results, the results for the whole
IA have been calculated. However, in order to synthe-
size the presentation of results, this section focuses on
the analysis of the aggregated results at the IA level
only, since these are the most relevant to the support of
public-sector decision making. In any case, individual
results for each farm type can be consulted in Appendix.
CAP-reformed policy scenario
With regard to the results of the new policy scenario
(CAP-reformed), the first point to be highlighted is that
the latest CAP reform will in itself have an important
impact on groundwater quality. It is thus expected that
this reform will produce a decrease of the NBAL indica-
tor of about 28.0% (from 38.95 to 27.98 kg N ha-1), due
to two main causes: a) the decoupling of farm subsidies,
which promotes the spread of agricultural production
(introduction of less nitrogen-intensive activities in the
crop plans) and b) the new sugar CMO reform, which
has forced a considerable reduction in the area devoted
to sugar-beet, one of the most nitrogen-intensive crops
in this IA.
The TGM indicator also increased after the applica-
tion of the recent CAP reform by about 4.8% compared
with the baseline scenario. Although the new crop plans
are more extensive and have lower added value, the
introduction of SFP maintains profitability, and even
increases it slightly from its level in the CAP-2000 sce-
nario. On the other hand, the AL indicator decreases
substantially (-22.9%). This loss in employment is also
a result of the replacement of more labour-intensive
crops, e.g. sugar-beet, by other less intensive crops
(rain-fed crops). Finally, regarding the impact on irriga-
tion water consumption (WATER indicator), the CAP
has also a positive effect on the demand for water, gen-
erating significant savings in water consumption, more
specifically 37.4% of the consumption in the CAP-2000
scenario.
Policy instrument 1: Nitrogen fertilization 
quotas
The results obtained for this policy instrument under
the new CAP framework (CAP-reformed + Instrument
1) can be seen in Table 2, which shows that less restric-
tive limitations on nitrogen fertilization, as represented
by the first two levels considered (120 and 100 kg N ha-
1), would generate an imperceptible decrease in nitrogen
balance. In fact, the NBAL indicator would advance
from -28.0% simply due to the application of the new
CAP, to -28.4% and -31.2%, respectively. Nonetheless,
this indicator is much more sensitive to more restricted
fertilization quotas, producing noticeable decreases in
the nitrogen balance for the remaining levels consid-
ered. This drop is above 50% for quotas of 60 and 40 kg
N ha-1.
Putting this policy instrument into operation would
also bring about a decrease in the TGM. As already com-
1 NBAL: nitrogen balance, TGM: total gross margin, AL: agricultural labour, WATER: water use.
Indicators1
Policy Scenario/Instrument NBAL TGM AL WATER
(kg N ha-1) (€ ha-1) (days ha-1) (m3 ha-1)
CAP-2000 (baseline scenario) 38.95 457.47 1.97 3,557 
CAP-reformed -28.0% +4.8% -22.9% -37.4% 
CAP-reformed + Instrument 1 
– 120 kg N ha-1 -28.4% +4.8% -23.4% -37.9% 
– 100 kg N ha-1 -31.2% +4.6% -25.9% -41.1% 
– 80 kg N ha-1 -42.4% +2.9% -34.5% -44.6%
– 60 kg N ha-1 -52.7% +0.5% -45.3% -54.7%
– 40 kg N ha-1 -69.4% -3.9% -56.9% -67.4%
Table 2. Evolution of indicators selected for the irrigated area. Nitrogen fertilization quotas
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mented on for the previous indicator, the first two fertil-
ization levels do not affect the TGM. This impact is only
significant for quotas below 100 kg N ha-1. Nonetheless,
the resulting decrease is moderated, and in the worst-
case scenario, the application of restriction level 40 kg N
ha-1, it changes from +4.8% (CAP-reformed scenario) to
-3.9%. Similarly, the implementation of the first two lev-
els of restriction of nitrogen fertilization considered
would have little impact on the EMP indicator. Neverthe-
less, the social impact of this instrument is considerable
for the most restrictive levels, leading to reductions in
employment of more than 50% for the 40 kg N ha-1
quota. Finally, with regard to the WATER indicator, this
instrument produces a positive impact, in the sense that
it leads to an additional reduction in demand for irriga-
tion water. Because of high nitrogen use crops are also
high water use, in the case of the implementation of quo-
tas, a drop in the use of nitrogen causes a decrease in
water consumption at the same time. In any case, in
order to be able to observe significant additional
decreases in water use, the limitation in nitrogen fertil-
ization would need to be below 100 kg N ha-1, as already
pointed out for the previous indicators. In this case, the
maximum reduction in the WATER indicator can reach -
67.4% for a quota of 40 kg N ha-1.
Policy instrument 2: Eco-tax for nitrogen 
fertilizers
The results of simulation models for this second poli-
cy instrument (CAP-reformed + Instrument 2) can be
seen in Table 3. The implementation of an economic
charge of €0.20 kg N-1 for nitrogen fertilizers would
produce, by itself, an almost insignificant decrease in the
liberation of nitrogen into the ecosystem. In fact, the
NBAL indicator would merely decrease from -28.0%
(CAP-reformed scenario) to -31.1%. However, higher
values of this eco-tax would produce larger falls in the
nitrogen balance e.g. an eco-tax higher than €0.40 kg N-
1 would lead to a more than 50% decline in the NBAL
indicator, reaching -64.4% for a charge of €1.00 kg N-1.
This instrument would also have a negative effect on
farm profitability. Thus, the implementation of an eco-
tax of €0.20 kg N-1 would practically eliminate the
increase in the TGM indicator caused by the CAP
reform. The application of higher charges would gener-
ate negative variations of the TGM compared with the
baseline scenario (CAP-2000), ranging from -3.7%
(€0.40 kg N-1) to -12.1% (€1.00 kg N-1). It should be
noted that this decrease in profitability would be pro-
duced both by the irrigators’ payments of taxes
(incomes transferred from private to public sector), as
well as the changes in crop plans discussed above (less
income from the market due to the substitution of the
most value-added crops). In any case, from a public
point of view the economic impact for this instrument
needs to be analyzed jointly with its effects on the pub-
lic-sector revenues (PUBR indicator) generated by the
eco-tax. It thus worth pointing out that the application
of different levels of eco-tax would generate a revenue
to the state ranging between €20.23 ha-1 (€0.20 kg N-1)
and €48.51 ha-1 (€1.00 kg N-1). These results show that
for a low eco-tax the loss in the irrigators’ net income is
almost equal to the gain in public revenue. Thus, lower
levels of eco-tax hardly result in overall economic lost,
1 See Table 2. 2 PUBR: public - sector revenue. 
Indicators1
Policy Scenario/Instrument NBAL TGM PUBR2 AL WATER
(kg N ha-1) (€ ha-1) (€ ha-1) (days ha-1) (m3 ha-1)
CAP-2000 (baseline scenario) 38.95 457.47 0.00 1.97 3,557 
CAP-reformed -28.0% +4.8% 0.00 -22.9% -37.4% 
CAP-reformed + Instrument 2
– €0.20 kg N-1 -31.1% +0.3% 20.23 -25.6% -41.1% 
– €0.40 kg N-1 -43.0% -3.7% 32.48 -34.9% -45.9% 
– €0.60 kg N-1 -51.8% -7.0% 40.09 -42.1% -51.2%
– €0.80 kg N-1 -58.2% -9.8% 45.86 -47.5% -56.9%
– €1.00 kg N-1 -64.4% -12.1% 48.51 -52.6% -62.6%
Table 3. Evolution of indicators selected for the irrigated area. Eco-tax for nitrogen fertilizers
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as this instrument only leads to a transfer of income
from the private to the public sector. However, higher
charges would involve losses in irrigators’ profitability
that would be greater than the increase in public-sector
revenue, thus generating a negative economic impact
(overall economic lost).
From a social point of view the application of the
first eco-tax level would generate a slight decrease in
the EMP indicator, because it has practically no impact
on the crop plan adopted by irrigators. Nevertheless, an
eco-tax above €0.40 kg N-1 would have a significant
social impact, producing a decrease in the demand for
labour generated by the agricultural system, that could
be 50% higher than the baseline scenario (€1.00 kg N-1
eco-tax). Finally, it should be emphasised that the
implementation of this policy instrument would have a
positive impact on the WATER indicator. In fact,
although the implementation of the two first eco-tax
levels proposed would lead to a small reduction in
demand for irrigation water, the application of an eco-
tax of €0.60 kgN-1 or more would produce savings in
irrigation water of more than 50% relative to the CAP-
2000 scenario.
Policy instrument 3: Irrigation water pricing
The implementation of water pricing in addition to
the CAP-reformed scenario produces the results shown
in Table 4. ‘Soft’ water tariffs (€0.01 or €0.02 m-3)
would result in a small additional decrease in the NBAL
indicator, in such a way that the nitrogen balance would
drop from the -28.0% obtained by implementing the
new CAP alone, to -32.9% and -37.7% when the above
prices are paid. However, higher water prices would
generate much more significant decreases in the NBAL
indicator. Indeed, ‘hard’ water tariffs (€0.05 or €0.06
m-3) would reduce the NBAL indicator by more than
50% with respect to the baseline scenario.
When the economic impact of the implementation of
irrigation water pricing is analysed, it can be observed a
negative effect in the TGM indicator. Thus, with a water
tariff of €0.06 m-3, farmers’ profitability would pro-
gressively decrease from +4.8% for the CAP-reformed
scenario to up to -15.2%. As mentioned above for poli-
cy instrument 2, the decrease in the TGM indicator is
due both to the payments made by irrigators to the pub-
lic administration for water tariffs, and to the changes
generated in the production plan. By comparing the loss
in the TGM indicator with the increase in the PUBR
indicator, it can be found that for low water tariffs this
instrument basically leads to an income transfer from
the private to the public sector. For higher tariffs, how-
ever, it can be appreciated how overall economic lost
appear; i.e. the payments received by the authorities
cannot compensate for the losses in private profitability.
On the other hand, as far as the AL indicator is con-
cerned, the negative impact of water pricing needs to be
emphasised, and it is worth noting that this instrument
would generate additional decreases ranging from -
28.1% for the lowest tariff (€0.01 m-3) to -48.8% when
the water price is €0.06 m-3. However, this policy
instrument would have a positive effect on the demand
for irrigation water, producing important savings of
1 See Table 3.
Indicators1
Policy Scenario/Instrument NBAL TGM PUBR AL WATER
(kg N ha-1) (€ ha-1) (€ ha-1) (days ha-1) (m3 ha-1)
CAP-2000 (baseline scenario) 38.95 457.47 0.00 1.97 3,557 
CAP-reformed -28.0% +4.8% 0.00 -22.9% -37.4% 
CAP-reformed + Instrument 2
– €0.01 m-3 -32.9% +0.3% 19.77 -28.1% -44.4% 
– €0.02 m-3 -37.7% -3.9% 34.93 -33.0% -51.0% 
– €0.03 m-3 -42.9% -7.5% 45.17 -38.1% -57.9% 
– €0.04 m-3 -47.9% -10.5% 50.90 -42.9% -64.6% 
– €0.05 m-3 -52.7% -13.0% 53.91 -46.8% -70.2% 
– €0.06 m-3 -55.0% -15.2% 58.73 -48.4% -73.0%
Table 4. Evolution of indicators selected for the irrigated area. Irrigation water pricing
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water resources. In fact, the WATER indicator would dis-
play a fall of as much as 73.0% vis-à-vis the baseline
scenario at water price of €0.06 m-3.
Policy instrument 4: Limitation of the surface
for intensive nitrogen activities
The simulations made for this policy instrument pro-
duce the results shown in Table 5. With this combination
of the CAP-reformed policy and policy instrument 4, the
nitrogen leached into the environment (NBAL) would
hardly be reduced for the first three levels of restriction
proposed (15%, 20% and 25%). This can be justified by
the spread of production in the IA after the application
of the last CAP reform, which has reduced, by itself, the
surface allocated to sugar-beet and maize. In this sense,
additional reductions in the NBAL indicator would
require a more restrictive limitation in the surface of the
potentially most pollutant crops. Thus, merely restrict-
ing the area of the most nitrogen-intensive crops by 10
and 5% would result in reductions in NBAL of -38.7%
and -48.4%, respectively.
For the reasons mentioned above (sugar-beet and
maize surface reduction caused by the last CAP reform),
the implementation of the first three proposed levels of
limitation of area under crop would not generate signifi-
cant changes in the remaining indicators. These indica-
tors would only be significantly affected by the introduc-
tion of restrictions around 10 or 5%. In the case of TGM,
with these constraint values, farm profitability would be
reduced by up to -0.6 and -9.8% respectively, vis-à-vis the
baseline scenario. The increasingly limited application of
this instrument would also aggravate its social effects (AL
indicator). In fact, the decrease in demand for labour
would reach 33.7% for the most restrictive case (a maxi-
mum of 5% of the area).
To conclude, it could also be pointed out that the
implementation of this policy instrument would gener-
ate a significant decrease in the WATER indicator for
restriction levels lower than 15%. Thus, water consump-
tion would be reduced in more than 50% due to the lim-
itations of the area sown for the more intensive nitrogen
activities of 10 and 5%. This circumstance can be
explained by the positive correlation between nitrogen
and water input, as commented above (the most nitro-
gen-intensive crops are also those ones with the greatest
water requirements).
Concluding remarks
The results of this study lead to conclude that the lat-
est CAP reform (partial decoupling of subsidies), which
has been in force since 2006, will itself lead to an
important reduction in nitrate pollution in the IA stud-
ied here. Moreover, this reform will improve the envi-
ronmental sustainability of agriculture by definitely
reducing the demand for irrigation water demand. This
will be achieved without either jeopardizing farm prof-
itability or increasing the public cost of support for the
agricultural sector. The only negative result of this
reform is the reduction in agricultural labour demand,
which might be a disincentive in terms of rural develop-
ment and population policy. At any rate, the overall val-
uation of this agricultural policy reform is positive.
1 See Table 2.
Indicators1
Policy Scenario/Instrument NBAL TGM AL WATER
(kg N ha-1) (€ ha-1) (days ha-1) (m3 ha-1)
CAP-2000 (baseline scenario) 38.95 457.47 1.97 3,557 
CAP-reformed -28.0% +4.8% -22.9% -37.4% 
CAP-reformed + Instrument 4 
– 25% -28.5% +4.4% -23.3% -38.0% 
– 20% -28.6% +4.3% -23.4% -38.1% 
– 15% -30.6% +3.9% -24.4% -40.4%
– 10% -38.7% -0.6% -28.5% -50.0%
– 5% -48.4% -9.8% -33.7% -60.0%
Table 5. Evolution of indicators selected for the Irrigated Area. Limitation of the surface for intensive nitrogen activities
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These results can be extrapolated to other irrigated
areas with similar characteristics: major presence of
CAP subsidy-dependent crops and irrigation water from
groundwater sources (high volumetric pumping cost,
which renders decision-making more dependent on the
relative profitability of crops). The change in CAP sub-
sidies by itself can thus be regarded as the most impact-
ing instrument for solving the problem of nitrate pollu-
tion in sensitive agricultural areas in inland Spain. In
fact, although the main objective of the CAP is to main-
tain agricultural income rather than reducing nitrogen
emissions, the way in which these payments are
assigned (including cross-compliance implementation)
is a key issue to modulate input use (production intensi-
ty) and environmental impacts of farming sector. It
should also be remembered that potential environmental
improvements regarding nitrogen emissions due to this
agricultural policy are still not exhausted. In the future
this impact could be intensified by the total decoupling
of subsidies, as has been proposed for the next CAP
reform, known as “Health Check”, which is still to be
approved.
If the reduction in nitrogen emissions due to the
application of the last CAP reform, or any further
reforms of this European policy, is not regarded as suf-
ficient to solve the problem of pollution caused by agri-
culture, other complementary policy instruments,
specifically designed for nitrate pollution reduction,
could be adopted. The results of the simulations con-
firm that the set of instruments analysed is effective
from an environmental point of view (reduction of nitro-
gen balance and water demand), although they could
have serious negative effects on farmers’ incomes and
would exacerbate the negative impact on demand for
agricultural labour. In any case, among the instruments
analysed here, the most suitable one from a technical
point of view is the application of nitrogen fertilization
quotas. Indeed, for a given reduction in nitrogen bal-
ance, this instrument would have the least negative
effect on the economic and social sustainability of agri-
culture in this IA.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that more accurate
analysis are needed in order to take also into account
monitoring and transaction costs and the existence of
imperfect information (Kampas and White, 2004;
Ozanne and White, 2007). All of them are key issues
when these policy instruments are to be implemented in
real agricultural systems. Considering these additional
costs, for both irrigators and the public authorities, new
simulations might well modify the evaluation reached in
this paper. For example, tax on fertilizers could be more
preferred than a quota because it is more easily applied
(lower monitoring and transaction costs). In addition,
other alternative instruments designed to control nitrate
pollution would be worth to be compared. In this sense,
a particular agro-environmental programme could be
thought in order to compensate farmers for imposing
limitation to the use of nitrogen (Bartolini et al., 2007).
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